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Naturally, competition policy is based on competition economics made applica-
ble in terms of law and its enforcement. Within the different branches of com-
petition economics, modern industrial economics, or more precisely game-
theoretic oligopoly theory, has become the dominating paradigm both in the 
U.S. (since the 1990s Post-Chicago movement) and in the EU (so-called more 
economic approach in the 2000s). This contribution reviews the state of the art 
in antitrust-oriented modern industrial economics and, in particular, critically 
discusses open questions and possible limits of basing antitrust on modern in-
dustrial economics. In doing so, it provides some hints how to escape current 
enforcement problems in industrial economics-based competition policy on 
both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, the paper advocates a change of the way 
modern industrial economics is used in competition policy: instead of more and 
more case-by-cases analyses, the insights from modern industrial economics 
should be used to design better competition rules. 
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1.  Introduction 
The advantages and disadvantages of an economic approach to competition law 
are currently discussed remarkably vividly among economists, legal scholar and 
also political scientists. It can hardly be doubted that the design and application 
of competition law must be informed by up-to-date knowledge about the under-
lying economics of competition. Similarly, however, it should also be clear that 
competition policy inherently represents a multidisciplinary issue and legal as 
well as political arguments cannot be neglected either. In this complex situa-
tion, the new controversy about an economic approach to competition law actu-
ally does not refer do the question of using economics at all. Instead, a specific 
branch of economic thinking, the current mainstream of industrial economics, 
characterizes this debate. In other words, the question is whether competition 
policy should embrace more strongly modern industrial economics as its sole or 
dominant economic influence. 
 
In this context, the conference organisers and editors of this volume asked me 
to prepare an analysis for a panel in which the following questions should be 
discussed in order “to critically assess the current and future capabilities of this 
approach and its performance in specific case analysis” (from the conference 
outline): 
 
•  How sure can we be of the assumptions and criteria that this line of think-
ing has established? 
 
•  What are the deficits and shortcomings of this approach to competition 
policy? 
 
•  What contributions can we expect in the future from this approach? 
 
•  What are the open questions that deserve more research? 
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•  How reliable are the analyses of economic effects in specific cases (e.g. 
merger simulation models)? 
 
In other words, emphasis is put on the remaining open problems and on possi-
ble limits, while recognizing the widely accepted merits of this approach. 
Therefore, this paper critically addresses open problems and possible limits as 
they have been raised in the literature and the underlying case practice. In doing 
so, it scrutinizes each issue as to whether (i) it hits this specific economic ap-
proach at all, (ii) represents a teething problem or (iii) has to be considered as a 
serious limitation. However, let me start with a disclaimer. The focus on the 
problems and limits rather than on the merits does by no means imply that the 
merits are disregarded! However, a serious industrial economics based competi-
tion policy strategy must pay attention and be aware of not yet solved problems 
and principal limitations. 
2.  The State of Modern Industrial Economics 
Let me start this very brief and somewhat superficial introduction to modern in-
dustrial economics by emphasizing what it is not: modern industrial economics 
is not about the model of perfect competition with all its heroic assumptions! 
Instead, the common background of the various and diverse approaches that 
loosely form modern industrial economics is the game-theoretic reformulation 
of the much older price theory of oligopolies. Following the landmark contribu-
tions from Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883), neoclassical price set up an 
oligopoly theory that, however, quickly ran into some stagnation because of a 
lack of available methods that could adequately and treatable model the core of 
the market form oligopoly, namely oligopolistic interdependency. The defining 
moment of an oligopolistic market is the explicit and conceived interaction be-
tween competitors. Different from the notion of perfect competition in which 
competition is an anonymous force not conceived as rivalry by the ‘competi- 
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tors’,
1 the oligopolists are aware that the success of their actions depend on the 
reactions of their (more or less well-known) competitors. They react to their ac-
tions and intentionally act while considering their reactions. In other words, the 
market participants play a strategic game, in which each player has some lee-
way to act and influence the market parameters but, notwithstanding, depends 
in his or her revenue on its competitors (as well as of the demand side of the 
market, of course). The adoption of game theory allows for explicitly modelling 
this oligopolistic interdependency and to analytically describe the underlying 
strategic game. Thereby, it departs from neoclassical economics by escaping the 
dichotomy of monopoly and polyopoly and addressing the dominant real-world 
market form – oligopolies – in a direct way. Although this process started as far 
back as in the 1960s, an explicit and comprehensive employment of the insights 
of game-theoretic oligopoly theory and the related (empirical) methods for anti-
trust purposes intensified only through the 1980s and entered competition pol-
icy practice (in the U.S.) more systematically in the 1990s (sometimes labelled 
as Post-Chicago economics; inter alia Brodley 1995; Baker 1999a; Hovenkamp 
2001). The EU followed a decade later with the so-called more economic ap-
proach (inter alia Christiansen 2006; Neven 2006; Röller & Stehmann 2006). 
 
Since modern industrial economics consists of a kaleidoscopic myriad of mod-
els in all areas of anticompetitive arrangements and conduct, it is impossible to 
summarize its ‘canon’ in a couple of paragraphs.
2 Therefore, I restrict myself to 
                                                            
1   “Competition has two different meanings. In ordinary discourse, competition means personal ri-
valry, with one individual seeking to outdo his known competitor. In the economic world [perfect 
neoclassical competition; OB], competition means almost the opposite. There is no personal rivalry 
in the competitive market place. There is no personal higgling. The wheat farmer in a free market 
does not feel himself in personal rivalry with, or threatened by, his neighbor, who is, in fact, his 
competitor. The essence of a competitive market is its impersonal character. No one participant can 
determine the terms on which other participants shall have access to goods or jobs. All take prices as 
given by the market and no individual can by himself have more than a negligible influence on price 
(…)” Friedman (1962: 119-120). See also Hayek (1948) for a forceful and comprehensive critique 
of denouncing a situation that actually encompasses the absence of virtually all elements of the real 
phenomenon competition with the label ‘perfect competition’. 
2   Standard textbooks (e.g. Tirole 2004; Carlton & Perloff 2005; Lipczynski et al. 2005 and many 
more) as well as specifically antitrust policy oriented handbooks and volumes (e.g. Motta  2004;  
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pointing out some selected major developments in the classic three areas of 
economic competition analysis, namely (i) collusion, (ii) mergers and (ii) exclu-
sionary, predatory and abusive strategies.  
 
In the area of collusion, the landmark contributions of modern industrial eco-
nomics include the analysis and derivation of so-called stabilizing factors. 
Modelling oligopolies as multi-stage prisoners dilemma games (including su-
pergames) yielded an impressive list of market characteristics (inter alia few 
competitors, homogeneous goods and cost structures, high market transparency, 
multimarket contact, entry and exit barriers, etc.) that help to stabilize illegal 
collusive arrangements as well as collusive equilibria. For instance, these in-
sights aid competition authorities in screening markets that are prone to collu-
sion or identify markets in which the emergence of coordinated effects (collec-
tive dominance) is likely. Furthermore, game-theoretic insights promoted the 
introduction of leniency programs for cartel defectors that arguably improved 
cartel detection and anticartel policy. In merger analysis, the concept of anti-
competitive unilateral effects of oligopolistic mergers in heterogeneous markets 
without dominance represented an innovation that subsequently entered anti-
trust practice. Furthermore, various efficiency rationales behind vertical integra-
tion processes have been emphasized. Conglomerate mergers have, on the one 
hand, found to be less anticompetitive due to efficiency arguments, but, on the 
other hand, conglomerate mergers in ‘neighbouring’ markets, i.e. markets that 
are distinct but very close to each other, have been found to be more like hori-
zontal mergers. The analysis of welfare effects of a large variety of business 
strategies (e.g. pricing, tying & bundling, entry deterrence, incompatibility crea-
tion, raising rivals’ costs, advertising, research & development, etc.) contributed 
to a more differentiated understanding of their competitive effects. In many 
cases, conditions could be derived and specified that distinguish a procompeti-
tive use of a strategy type from an anticompetitive one (e.g. predatory pricing). 
                                                           
Neumann & Weigand 2004; Kaplow & Shapiro 2007; Buccirossi 2008; Kerber & Schwalbe 2008) 
offer good overviews on the widely accepted canon of the field. However, industrial economics is a 
very dynamic research field and the body of knowledge expands and evolves remarkably rapidly.  
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On the one hand, this led to a decrease of anticompetitive concerns regarding 
several business practices (e.g. price discrimination). On the other hand, some 
practices entered the radar of antitrust authorities (e.g. raising rivals’ costs). 
 
It must be emphasized, however, that the competition policy conclusions are far 
from providing a general framework or consistent paradigm for antitrust author-
ities. Probably, Fisher’s (1991: 207) “second organizing principle” that sug-
gests that “the principal result of theory is to show that nearly anything can 
happen” might be somewhat exaggerated but it entails a true core. In this re-
gard, modern industrial economics do not represent a (more or less) coherent 
school like the famous Chicago or Harvard Schools of Antitrust Analysis or the 
German Freiburg School of Competition Law and Economics.
3 An advantage of 
not being such type of a school of thought might be that ideology plays a much 
smaller role.
4 However, the analysis in chapter 3 will show that the elements of 
arbitrariness also cause some of the problems when it comes to competition pol-
icy practice. 
3.  Limits and Open Problems 
Even the brief overview in the preceding section demonstrates that modern in-
dustrial economics provide a powerful and rich theoretical framework for ana-
lysing competition and business strategies on markets. Therefore, the step to-
wards grounding practical competition policy and the application of competi-
tion law more firmly on the theories and methods that form modern industrial 
economics represents a logical and straightforward development. Naturally, 
competition policy must be based on the economics of competition since “anti-
trust law is designed to protect and facilitate the competitive process itself, and 
the only way to do that effectively is to understand what one is trying to protect 
                                                            
3   See for an overview on the influential schools of thought in competition economics e.g. Budzinski 
(2008: 296-313). 
4   There is a danger, however, that ideologies are just hidden away in ostensibly ‘non-ideological’ 
models.  
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or facilitate” (Wood 1999: 83). And, as the evolution of competition economics 
progresses and develops new insights, theories and methods, the new know-
ledge about the nature and the effects of competition must be injected into 




However, changing – or modernizing – the underlying economic fundamentals 
of competition policy does not imply that automatically everything gets better. 
Teething problems necessarily occur. Furthermore, the inherent limits of a new 
approach might be initially neglected as the advocates of change need to stress 
(and exaggerate?) the advantages in order to push the reform through. However, 
a serious and sustainable industrial economics based competition policy strat-
egy must pay attention and be aware of not yet solved problems and principal 
limitations. Or, in other words, when the decision ‘if’ is made, the questions 
‘how’ and ‘how far reaching’ gain importance. 
 
The more economic approach has been employed on both sides of the Atlantic 
for quite a while now and in a number of cases. In the course of the academic 
discussion as well as in the application of theories and methods in case practice, 
objections have been raised and problems have occurred. In the following sub-
sections, selected important problems and objections are reported and subse-
quently analysed whether (i) they hit the more economic approach at all, (ii) 
represent teething problems or (ii) have to be considered as serious limitations.  
3.1.  Data Availability 
Among the major innovations of a modern industrial economics-based competi-
tion policy, the employment of new quantitative instruments to detect and as-
                                                            
5   A much more difficult question is when new economic thinking is settled and accepted enough to 
base policies on it – in particular in the light of the deficiencies of scientific theory progress through 
sequences of dominating paradigms. See Budzinski (2008) for an analysis of these meta-theoretic 
implications of the more economic approach.  
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sess anticompetitive firm behaviour plays an outstanding role. Econometrics 
and simulation techniques aim to quantitatively model real-world cases based 
upon real-world data and to derive precise quantitative assessments and predic-
tions (inter alia Crooke et al. 1999; Röller 2005; Werden 2005; Neven 2006). 
For the sake of the following reasoning, these innovative instruments can be 
classified into two categories: 
 
•  Ex post empirical analysis: with the help of econometric methods the 
structure of the market and the patterns of interaction between the market 
participants can be estimated for past periods. For instance, this consid-
erably improves the detection of collusive behaviour in the past (cartel 
policy, but also coordinated effects analysis in merger control). It also can 
be used to estimate the influence of the presence of specific competitors 
on the price-setting behaviour of merging (merger control) or dominating 
(control of abusive and predatory strategies) companies, like it was suc-
cessfully done in the Staples/Office Depot merger case.
6 Furthermore, this 
kind of econometrics helps to identify the existence and magnitude of 
competitive pressure that two companies exert on each other. This infor-
mation is needed for unilateral effects analysis in merger control as well 




•  Ex ante simulation: simulation models allow for predictions of welfare ef-
fects that lie in the (near) future and are likely to be the cause of an al-
leged or real restriction of competition. Up to now, simulation models 
have predominantly been used in merger control in order to predict the 
welfare effects of a merger. The best-known examples include Interstate 
                                                            
6   In brief and somewhat simplified, the proposed U.S. merger between Staples and Office Depot was 
blocked because econometric analysis revealed that these two companies pre-merger exerted sig-
nificant competitive pressure on each other that would have been lost post-merger (Baker 1999b; 
Baker & Rubinfeld 1999; Dalkir & Warren-Boulton 2004; Baker & Pitofsky 2009). 
7   These are just some major examples that do not attempt to be exhaustive.  
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Bakeries/Continental Baking Co., Kimberley-Clark/Scott Paper, 
Volvo/Scania, Lagardère/Natexis/VUP, Nuon/Reliant, Oracle-PeopleSoft, 
and Häagen-Dazs/Dreyer’s (overview: Budzinski & Ruhmer 2009). An-
other field could embrace predation strategies where simulation could be 
employed to predict future welfare effects in cases of successful predation 
of fringe competitors. 
 
An obvious limitation for the use of these instruments is data availability. Com-
prehensive and precise data is required in order to have a sufficiently broad 
fundament for a serious and reliable application of sophisticated econometric 
methods. The same is true for merger simulation models which must be cali-
brated with comprehensive market data so that reliable results can be derived. 
In contrast to some critical voices, sufficiently comprehensive and extensive 
data is available for several markets. In particular, this includes markets where 
data from scanner cashpoints is available and also auction markets often pro-
vide a workable data volume and quality. However, it must also be admitted 
that there are many markets where such data is simply not available, for in-
stance markets with less frequent transactions, specific types of wholesale mar-
kets, etc. As a consequence, (ex post or ex ante) quantitative analysis is not al-
ways feasible.  
 
In cases where a lack of data quantity and/or quality does not allow for quanti-
tative analysis, qualitative, more structural analysis must necessarily prevail. 
Although a lack of data also affects the quality of these types of more tradi-
tional methods, the effect is less severe since the less detailed, often more gen-
eral ‘rules-of-thumb’ incorporate knowledge about typical effects and tacit 
knowledge. Dealing with low or fuzzy case information is well-nigh the domain 
of qualitative methods. The co-existence of detailed quantitative case analysis 
(when data is available) and more qualitative ‘rule-of-thumb’ analysis (when no 
sufficient data is available) raises the rarely discussed question whether this in-
volves an unequal treatment of antitrust cases in data-rich markets compared to 
such in low-data markets. Focusing on employing econometrics and simulation  
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could lead to a bias towards data-rich markets – involving negative welfare ef-
fects from neglecting data-poor markets. An important question in this regard is 
whether data availability can be expected to improve in the future (more scan-
ner cashpoints, more digital data, etc.). This might decide about the character of 
the problem ‘data availability’ as a temporary restriction or a more principal 
limitation for the use of quantitative assessment and analysis methods in anti-
trust cases. In general, however, there is a lack of economic research addressing 
the intersections, interfaces and interaction of quantitative and qualitative in-
struments in antitrust proceedings.
8 
3.2.  The Multi-dimensional Character of Competition 
A widespread criticism of modern industrial economics and its methods refers 
to its focus on short-run price and output effects. The underlying reasons for 
this focus are (i) the importance of these effects for welfare (Farrell & Shapiro 
2008: 7), (ii) the (comparatively feasible) quantifiability of these effects, and 
(iii) due to the price-theoretic roots of theoretical industrial economics, these ef-
fects have a long tradition, wherefore a large number of well-developed models 
with this focus is available. However, there is more to competition than short-
run price and output effects – and these additional dimensions of competition 
are usually neglected by industrial economics-modelling despite their undis-
puted contribution to welfare. According to the literature, the neglected dimen-
sions include more short-run non-price elements of competition like e.g. barri-
ers to entry and exit, buyer power, brand, promotion and placement effects, 
shelf space competition, strategy effects on/of market participants, etc. (inter 
alia Scheffman 2004; Bengtsson 2005; Walker 2005: 487-490) along with more 
long-run dimensions like innovation and dynamic efficiency (e.g. Audretsch et 
al. 2001; Gaffard & Quéré 2006; Baker 2007; Katz & Shelanski 2007a; Evans 
&  Hylton 2008), diversity (e.g. Farrell 2006; Kerber 2009b), adaptive effi-
                                                            
8   But see Baker & Bresnahan (2008) for a summary of the state of knowledge in this regard.  
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ciency (Budzinski 2004), fairness (Gal 2009) as well as economic freedom (e.g. 
Möschel 2001; A. Schmidt 2008; Kerber 2009a: 106-118).
9  
 
It should be quite obvious and less controversial that a competition policy that 
neglects all these welfare-relevant dimensions of competition and instead ex-
clusively focuses on price and output effects displays significant and severe 
shortcomings. In a recent study, Froeb et al. (2007) demonstrate against the 
background of the controversial Häagen-Dazs/Dreyer’s merger that the neglect 
of non-price dimensions can easily lead to false competition policy decisions.
10 
Furthermore, there are cases where neither (advanced) Bertrand- nor Cournot 
models of oligopoly competition adequately describe the competitive interac-
tion on the underlying market as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, 
causing enforcement problems of a price- and output-focused approach (Farrell 
& Shapiro 2008: 15). 
 
However, do non-price dimensions of competition really represent a blind spot 
of modern industrial economics? Admittedly, there is some truth in this criti-
cism for the hitherto predominantly applied models in antitrust cases. However, 
new and more advanced models might heal that deficiency and integrate more 
and more non-price effects into the existing models. A prime example is Froeb 
et al. (2007) who do not only show that neglecting promotional competition (in 
the Häagen-Dazs/Dreyer’s case) leads to false decisions but also demonstrate 
how this non-price dimension can be integrated into a simulation model of this 
merger. Moreover, in the Oracle/PeopleSoft case, for instance, the merger simu-
                                                            
9   From a more fundamental, economic systems-oriented perspective, competition represents a supe-
rior coordination mechanism for economic behaviour because it induces allocative efficiency (short-
term welfare effects), innovative efficiency (incentives to innovate and imitate; mid-term welfare ef-
fects), adaptive efficiency (keeping the economy flexible regarding changing environments; evolu-
tionary welfare effects; long-term welfare effects), consumer sovereignty (producers are induced to 
adjust their supply according to the preferences of the consumers) and contributes to economic free-
dom (liberal welfare effects). See e.g. Budzinski (2008). 
10   In this case, the inclusion of the non-price dimension of competition “promotional activities” alone 
significantly reduced the welfare effects compared to the price-and-output-only simulation model.  
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lation models featured (stylized) effects on quality and merger-specific reduced 
choice options for consumers (Budzinski & Christiansen 2007). This goes hand 
in hand with a large body of the more theoretical and not-yet-applied modelling 
in industrial economics that addresses – at the least – most of the short-run non-
price dimensions of competition. Furthermore, there is an extensive body of in-
dustrial economics literature on innovation and dynamic efficiency. Eventually, 
the scientific progress of industrial economics also embraces an extension of 
methods, for instance towards more complex multistage and supergames; ‘real’ 
dynamics, etc. And, of course, more can be expected from the research efforts 
in this area. Thus, can the tendency towards neglecting non-price elements of 
competition be classified as a teething problem that will be healed in the course 
of further research? 
 
The answer is partly ‘yes’, but unfortunately there is also indication of more 
persistent problems. For instance, economists face ongoing difficulties to make 
(industrial economics) innovation models applicable for antitrust (Baker 2008; 
Evans & Hylton 2008). In the same veins, the employment of more advanced 
models (like supergames or dynamic modelling) looks likely to quickly hit its 
limits regarding the suitability of such types of models for antitrust practice. 
Can model complexity still be handled? Is it still possible to derive clear-cut re-
sults which are necessary for antitrust proceedings? The problem of model 
complexity and the tractability of more complex models leads to another limita-
tion. Although it is often possible and feasible to introduce one or two addi-
tional non-price competition dimensions into a price-and-output-focused model, 
real-world cases usually involve multiple competition dimensions that addition-
ally interact with each other. From nowadays perspective it is difficult to see 
how this can sufficiently be healed by an advance in industrial economics 
methods in the near future. 
 
The latter issue is even more relevant as there are competition dimensions that 
are non-quantifiable by nature. Today, this is to a considerable extent true for 
long-run effects like innovation capabilities, diversity, adaptive efficiency, the  
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coordinating force of competition, etc. Many of these effects cannot be ade-
quately modelled with contemporary methods and even in the face of dynamic 
theory progress it remains highly doubtful whether this will change in the next 
decades. For the application to antitrust cases, it is even more problematic that 
these effects can hardly ever be captured by instruments like econometrics and 
simulation techniques. However, to be very clear, lacking ability to make a 
phenomenon mathematically feasible or to quantify the respective variables 
does not mean that these effects carry less importance for real-world welfare. 
Therefore, neglecting some important welfare effects just because they are not 
quantifiable is very likely to cause deficient decisions.  
 
One consequence of the preceding reasoning is that competition policy must in-
evitably deal with uncertainty. Dealing with uncertainty and principle limits to 
predictability have always been the core of market process-oriented competition 
economics (pioneered by Hayek 1948, 1978) and connecting their insights more 
strongly with antitrust-focused modern industrial economics might represent an 
interesting – but to my knowledge not yet existing – research programme. More 
recently, risk-based approaches, inter alia from decision theory, have been in-
jected into the debate (Katz & Shelanski 2007b) and might represent an alterna-
tive way forward. 
 
Altogether, the limitations discussed in this section might well be alleviated in 
the course of theory progress. However, it must also be considered that some 
effects might remain being non-quantifiable due to their nature.  
3.3.  Competing Models 
The common feature of modern industrial economics-based competition policy 
is that the competitive patterns of the underlying market must be modelled. Ide-
ally, the industrial economics-model is chosen or designed that most accurately 
pictures the real market and the real case. However, virtually all antitrust cases 
were characterized by competing industrial economics-models, injected by the  
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different parties to the case.
11 Most prominent was, of course, the Microsoft 
case where the expertises of leading industrial economics covered almost the 
complete scale from ‘most anticompetitive’ to ‘completely procompetitive’.
12 
However, competing models also occurred in many merger cases and represent 
more the rule than the exception. Actually, the controversial industrial-
economic treatment of some cases triggered fierce academic debates
13 – and, 
thereby, drove theory development (in most cases without eventually resolving 
the conflicts). Thus, economic evidence in antitrust cases often leads to a ‘battle 
of experts’ as each party (competition agency, defending firms as well as com-
petitors, costumers and suppliers of defending firms) injects its own models into 
the proceedings. As a consequence, law courts – the deciding body in the U.S. 
and the appeal body in the EU – struggle to (i) deal with the increasingly com-
plex models offered by economic experts and (ii) identify the ‘right’ model that 
should guide the decision. Such a battle of experts, a widespread critique reads, 
decreases the quality of legal decision making. 
 
The battle of experts is driven by two dimensions: 
 
1. The analytical dimension of the selection problem refers to the non-
existence of one ‘right’ model. Each model inevitably must simplify the 
underlying real case (complexity reduction) in order to create meaningful 
information or, as Joan Robinson (1962: 33) puts it: “A model which took 
account of all the variegation of reality would be of no more use than a 
map at the scale of one to one.” The necessary complexity reduction cre-
                                                            
11   See generally on the problem of competing economic evidence and expertise Mandel (1999), Pos-
ner (1999), Hovenkamp (2002), Werden (2007), Budzinski & Ruhmer (2009), Lianos (2009), and 
Wigger (2009). 
12   See inter alia Bresnahan (2001); Fisher & Rubinfeld (2001); Gilbert & Katz (2001); Schmalensee 
(2001); Werden (2001); Evans et al. (2005). 
13   Next to Microsoft, see for instance GE/Honeywell (Evans & Salinger 2002; Reynolds & Ordover 
2002; Gerber 2003) or Volvo/Scania (Hausman & Leonard 2005; Ivaldi & Verboven 2005a,b).  
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ates scope for competing models since different models can simplify on 
different parameters of the underlying case (Budzinski 2009). 
 
2. The policy dimension of the selection problem refers to political interests 
of experts working for the competition authority or allegedly anticompeti-
tive-behaving companies or their competitors, customers or suppliers. 
Partisan models injected by the parties to an antitrust case need not be of 
insufficient quality just because they are biased. Furthermore, from an 
economic perspective of self-interested agents and agencies, the competi-
tion authorities are not necessarily completely unbiased either. If each 
side to a trial sends (f.i. equally) high-ranked experts to defend their case, 
then it might become rather difficult for a decision body, for instance a 
law court, to discriminate between the proposed models. 
 
However, from an economic perspective it is not self-evident that such a battle 
of experts is naturally deficient. Actually, it represents a competition of experts 
and such a device could alternatively also be viewed to be an efficient way to 
detect and create knowledge about the case.
14 However, this specific competi-
tion might be characterized by considerable imperfections, leading to market 
failure. In particular, asymmetric and distorted information might be so severe 
that the identification problem (choice of the most adequate models among the 
competing proposals) cannot be solved. Furthermore, existing institutional con-
ditions might be deficient. For instance, if the burden of proof lies predomi-
nantly or even exclusively on one party, then experts’ competition might 
asymmetrically weaken this party – as it is easier to raise doubts on economic 
evidence than to provide better or more reliable economic evidence.
15  
 
                                                            
14   The sheer fact that the experts are biased (partisan interests) does not necessarily change that as-
sessment per se. See Becker’s (1983) model of an efficient competition among pressure groups for 
political influence. 
15   The related issue of standards of proof will be discussed in section 3.4.  
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In other words, the phenomenon of inefficient battles of experts does not neces-
sarily represent an argument against economic evidence. Instead, it calls for bet-
ter competition rules for the imperfect competition among experts. Only if the 
market failures cannot be healed by better procedural institutions, this might 
turn out to be a ‘hard’ limitation for a modern industrial-economics based com-
petition policy. Possible solutions or remedies for the imperfections and defi-
ciencies of economic experts’ competition might be (advanced) standards for 
economic expertise (pro: Werden et al. 2004; Werden 2007; con: Lianos 2009), 
enhanced scope for neutral, non-partisan experts (appointed by the courts) 
(Baker & Bresnahan 2008: 30-32) or modified rules on the allocation of the 
burden of proof (Budzinski & Christiansen 2007: 157-158; Parret 2008). Alto-
gether, a systematic economic analysis of the working conditions and efficiency 
effects of competition among economic experts – including possible remedies – 
represents a task for further research. 
3.4.  Erosion of the Protection of Competition? 
An important concern that has been raised in the debate about a modern indus-
trial economics-based approach to competition policy hints to a possible erosion 
of the level of competition protection. This concern can be distinguished into 
two variants: an invitation to nonenforcement and an unintended weakening of 
antitrust. 
3.4.1.  Invitation to Nonenforcement 
This view alleges to some degree that the focus on modern industrial economics 
as the sole of dominating base of competition policy is not (only) motivated by 
the target of basing antitrust firmly on modern mainstream economic thinking. 
In addition, the advocates of this critique hint to a related policy agenda that 
seeks to weaken antitrust interventions into ‘free markets’ and to strengthen the 
position of big enterprises. This tendency is sometimes labelled as the victory 
of the Chicago School in Europe – quasi through the backdoor – and an invita-
tion to nonenforcement (I. Schmidt 2007, 2008). The latter results from the in- 
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troduction of ‘defences for everything’, i.e. the traditional focus on allocative 
efficiency becomes qualified by an increasing focus on productive efficiency. 
According to this view, modern industrial economics introduces predominantly 
defences of otherwise anticompetitive firm behaviour into competition policy. 
Possible efficiency effects of otherwise anticompetitive business strategies are 
derived from a kaleidoscopic world of models (with sometimes rather specific 
assumptions) and injected into the antitrust world as the erosion of clear pre-
sumptions of anticompetitive effects. Examples include the strengthening of the 
efficiency defence for mergers, the emphasis on potential efficiencies of vertical 
strategies,
16 the focus on efficiency effects of predatory strategies, and many 
more. Instead of leading to a better assessment of individual cases, the critics 
emphasize that the efficiency focus makes almost every type of business behav-
iour justifiable and due to the notorious lack of data (see section 3.1), lacking 
justiciability of economic criteria and, in particular, the absence of an exact the-
ory that can explain dynamic performance quantities (I. Schmidt 2008: 74), this 
represents an invitation to nonenforcement – motivated by political reasoning.
17  
 
While the suspected general tendency towards less enforcement can actually be 
backed by empirical evidence (see section 3.4.2), this line of reasoning is treat-
ing modern industrial economics somewhat unfair in a couple of respects. First 
of all, modern industrial economics considerably departs both from neoclassical 
price theory (see section 2) and from the ‘ideology’ of the Chicago School of 
Antitrust Analysis.
18 In particular, modern industrial economics (or Post-
Chicago antitrust economics) have qualified and even reverted several insights 
                                                            
16   The recent controversial skipping of the U.S. per se prohibition of resale price maintenance in fa-
vour of a case-by-case rule of reason approach represents a prime example. See Graglia (2007), 
Peeperkorn (2008) and Breyer (2009). 
17   “The argument, that the more economic approach serves a maximization of consumer welfare as the 
final objective of competition policy, is obviously of politically-tactical nature and aims to gloss 
over the deliberate weakening of competition policy“ (I. Schmidt 2008: 74; translation OB).  
18   See for reviews – in praise as well as more critical - of the Chicago School and its relation to other 
schools within competition economics Posner (1979), Fox & Sullivan (1987), Schmidt & Rittaler 
(1989), Kovacic & Shapiro (2000), Budzinski (2008) and Schmalensee (2008).  
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from Chicago. Where the Chicago School predominantly acknowledged pro-
competitive efficiency effects, modern industrial economics implies a much 
more critical view and derives considerably more scope for anticompetitive ar-
rangements and effects, for instance regarding vertical relations, dominant firm 
behaviour, foreclosure, exclusive dealing and predatory strategies (inter alia 
Riordan & Salop 1995; Baker 1999a; the chapters in Pitofsky 2008).
19 More-
over, next to a more critical assessment of well-known types of potential re-
strictions of competition, modern industrial economics also identified additional 
areas of competitive concern. Two examples illustrate this. First, unilateral ef-
fects in heterogeneous oligopolies, implying negative welfare effects of mergers 
in such markets well below any dominance or monopolization threshold, repre-
sent an innovation from game-theoretic oligopoly theory not known in that way 
before (overview: Werden & Froeb 2008). Second, the anticompetitive effects 
of meeting-the-competition clauses and other specific discount schemes appear 
considerably more severe in modern industrial economics than in many other 
approaches (e.g. Salop 1986; Edlin & Emch 1999; Kretschmer & Budzinski 
2009). Consequently, modern industrial economics does not only consist of new 
defences, it also adds new theories of harm. In this regard, the invitation-to-
nonenforcement critique, when targeted on modern industrial economics as an 
economic fundament to competition policy, overshoots the mark and a more 
balanced view seems to be appropriate. 
3.4.2.  Unintended Weakening of Antirust 
However, there is empirical indication from the U.S. that a stronger reliance on 
quantitative economic evidence might unintentionally weaken antitrust en-
forcement, in particular in the area of merger control (Baker & Shapiro 2008; 
Farrell & Shapiro 2008) but also with respect to dominant firm behaviour as 
well as exclusionary and predatory strategies (e.g. Salop 2007, 2008; Hovenk-
amp 2008). In merger control, the U.S. antitrust authorities failed to success-
fully challenge a number of mergers that raised serious anticompetitive con-
                                                            
19   Budzinski (2008: 301-305) provides an overview of selected landmark theory contributions.  
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cerns. However, the courts rejected to prohibit these mergers because of doubts 
about the reliability and accurateness of the presented (industrial-) economic 
evidence. Prominent examples include Oracle/PeopleSoft, Nestlé (Häagen-
Dazs)/Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Whirlpool/Maytag or Whole Foods/Wild 
Oats. Notorious weaknesses have been the economic evidence on market de-
lineation (although often not even relevant for the overall welfare effects of the 
merger in question) as well as simulation models and quantitative predictions 
(Budzinski & Christiansen 2007; Froeb et al. 2007; Baker & Shapiro 2008; 
Farrell & Shapiro 2008). 
 
Of course, it could be argued that the American antitrust authorities were sim-
ply wrong in challenging those mergers. The serious and (from an economic 
point of view) quite convincing anticompetitive concerns, however, are some-
what supported by recent ex post studies about several eventually cleared merg-
ers that initially raised anticompetitive concerns (e.g. Ashenfelter & Hosken 
2008; Weinberg 2008). These studies come to the conclusion that many of these 
mergers were actually harmful from hindsight, allowing for the conclusion that 
a prohibition would have been beneficial.
20  
 
Although empirical evidence à la Baker & Shapiro (2008) is lacking for Euro-
pean merger control, there is at least indication for comparable tendencies in the 
last decade. The Commission’s judgement were nullified in several high-profile 
merger cases by the European Court of First Instance, notably covering next to 
three merger prohibitions (Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand, Tetra La-
val/Sidel) also one clearance decision (Sony/BMG). This is accompanied by a 
couple of spectacular U-turns in the assessment of merger proposals (e.g. Ora-
cle/PeopleSoft; Sony/BMG) – from a sharp statement of objection to an (al-
most) unconditional clearance decision. Furthermore, some commentators refer 
to an all-time low of prohibitions (German Monopolies Commission 2006, 
2008; Christiansen 2009: 570-572). Since 2001 the Commission issued only 
                                                            
20   Regarding the Häagen-Dazs/Dreyer’s merger, Froeb et al. (2007) come to a comparable conclusion 
with the help of an advanced merger simulation model.  
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two prohibitions (ENI/EDP/GDP; Ryanair/Aer Lingus) despite the occurrence 
of several controversial cases (e.g. T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring; E.ON/MOL; 
Korsnäs/Assidomän Cartonboard; Inco/Falconbridge; Friesland/Campina; Sta-
toilHydro/ConocoPhilips). Similarly, tendencies towards less enforcement in 
the area of abuses of dominant positions have been mentioned (e.g. Lyons 
2008). There is a possibility that the antitrust authorities on both sides of the At-
lantic have become more reluctant to fight restrictions of competition (except of 
hardcore cartels) in fear of court defeats. Instead, in merger control for instance, 
they rely more strongly on conditional clearances with remedies. However, em-
pirical economic studies demonstrate that remedies might often not suffice to 
alleviate welfare losses from anticompetitive combinations and strategies; in-
stead, only outright prohibitions seem to be effective remedies (Duso et al. 
2006; Seldeslachts et al. 2008). 
 
In summary, there is some empirical support for the thesis that a more industrial 
economics based competition policy can unintentionally weaken antitrust en-
forcement by eroding the power of the antitrust authorities to prove anticom-
petitive concerns (Farrell & Katz 2006; Salop 2007; Baker & Shapiro 2008; 
Farrell & Shapiro 2008; Lyons 2008; Seldeslachts et al. 2008; Sørgard 2008; 
Christiansen 2009).
21 In the areas of merger control as well as abusive, exclu-
sionary and predatory strategies, this tendency might cause a systematic bias 
towards false positives
22 (Farrell & Shapiro 2008: 20; Goldschmid 2008). Note, 
however, that anticartel policy cannot be included in this reasoning about the 
danger of underenforcement. Quite in contrast, cartel detection activity seems to 
have increased and improved through modern industrial economics-based com-
petition policies – although it is hard to tell whether the increasing numbers of 
detected cartels on both sides of the Atlantic reliably hints to a better detection 
ratio (or rather to an increasing number of cartels). 
                                                            
21   However, see for a contrary assessment Carlton (2007). 
22   This implies that the focus is about avoiding to prohibit potentially efficient strategies and arrange-
ments and that the price of this focus is the neglect of false negatives, i.e. too many anticompetitive 
strategies and arrangements are allowed.   
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3.4.3.  Towards an Explanation? The Specific Problems of Predictive 
Quantitative Economic Evidence 
However, why might this tendency represent an unintended weakening of anti-
trust enforcement? An explanation could be the lacking fit between the new in-
struments (generating predictive quantitative economic evidence) and the ‘old’ 
institutional environment. The character of the new type of economic evidence, 
in particular its (ostensibly) precise quantitative nature, might have caused an 
unintended and ‘tacit’ increase in the standard of proof as well as an unintended 
and ‘tacit’ shift in the allocation of the burden of proof. In support of this hy-
pothesis, two interrelated issues can be discussed: pseudo precision and the de-
gree of certainty of quantitative evidence. 
 
In a different context, Hansen & Heckman (1996: 98) describe a caveat with the 
use of numerical predictions as follows: “Precise numerical outputs are re-
ported, but with no sense of the confidence that can be placed in the estimates. 
This produces a false sense of precision.” The underlying implication is that 
numerical predictions and quantitative evidence create an illusion of precision 
that deviates from and tend to ignore the capacity of the estimates. If a price in-
crease, for instance, is predicted to be 7.7 per cent as the outcome of a – inevi-
tably – simplifying merger simulation model, then this creates a stronger sense 
(or even perception) of precision than a more vague qualitative assessment à la 
‘considerable price increases must be expected’. The problematic implication of 
this cognitive framing effect (Kahneman 2003a, 2003b) is that it becomes easier 
to shatter the trust in the evidence by the defendants. In the case of the numeri-
cal prediction it might suffice to create doubt on the exact figure of the price in-
crease (‘with other model specifications, the increase becomes significantly 
lower’), whereas in the case of the qualitative assessment the hurdle to create 
doubt that price increases occur at all is much higher. This problem becomes 
further aggravated if predictive quantitative economic evidence is – intention-
ally or unintentionally – treated as forensic evidence that attempts to prove facts 
of the past. A merger simulation model, for instance, can never achieve the de- 
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gree of certainty of a genetic fingerprint simply because future effects can not 
be perfectly foreseen in a non-deterministic world. 
 
As a consequence, the party who bears the burden of proof faces an implicitly 
increased standard of proof. It actually must prove to a higher degree of cer-
tainty that the predicted effects are reliable – and, sometimes, the demanded de-
gree of certainty might become prohibitive. Since the competition agencies 
carry the burden of proof regarding most issues,
23 their power to enforce the 
competition rules becomes unintentionally weakened. The controversial cases 
mentioned in the preceding sub-chapter include some good examples where de-
fendants escaped prohibitions or stricter conditions because doubt on the preci-
sion of quantitative economic evidence could be raised (relatively) easy. The 
predictions of the merger simulation of Oracle/PeopleSoft, where different 
models on both side of the Atlantic pointed to very similar severe anticompeti-
tive effects (comparison: Budzinski & Christiansen 2007), were not dismissed 
because of a better model with contrary predictions. Similarly, doubts on the 
precision of calculations – and not proof to the contrary – eroded the anticom-




The problem of the interaction of predictive quantitative economic evidence 
with the standard of proof as well as with the allocation of the burden of proof 
has not yet been sufficiently analysed. The innovative instruments of generating 
quantitative economic evidence have been injected into antitrust practice with-
out research into their institutional fit with the existing institutional environ-
                                                            
23   An exception would be the efficiency defence where the merging companies carry the burden of 
proof. This might explain why there is (almost) no case where efficiencies have played a major role 
in front of a law court or driven its decision. 
24   The European Commission was put into a somewhat curious situation when the Court of First In-
stance rejected its clearance decision on the Sony/BMG merger, emphasizing that there is a sym-
metric standard of proof for prohibitions (proof of harm) and clearances (proof of the absence of 
harm). This leaves it open what should be done if neither harm nor the absence of harm can be 
proved with sufficient certainty. See Aigner et al. (2007) for an analysis.  
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ment. Given the lack of scientific knowledge on this fit, it seems rather likely 
that the effectiveness of these instruments could be improved by an adjusted in-
stitutional environment. 
3.5.  Continuity Assumption vs. Structural Interruptions 
Another bunch of critical remarks addresses the implicit continuity assumption 
inherent in ex ante-oriented industrial economics methods of competition 
analysis. Predictive methods (like merger simulation) assume that markets be-
fore an anticompetitive incident (e.g. pre-merger markets) more or less equal 
the markets after the anticompetitive incident (e.g. post-merger markets) with 
the exception of the event (e.g. the merger). For instance, merger simulation 
models usually assume that the post-merger market mirrors the pre-merger 
market with the exception that the competition between the merging companies 
vanishes. Similarly, industrial economics-analyses of abusive strategies usually 
assume that the post-markets mirror the pre-abuse markets with the exception 
of the abuse. In other words, usually only one aspect is changed and the rest is 
assumed to remain unchanged, like the form of competition, the positioning of 
the products, the available strategy options, etc. Thus, quantitative predictive 
methods usually rely upon past data (calibration) in order to predict future ef-
fects and market outcomes. 
 
However, does the underlying fundamental competition process actually re-
mains unchanged? This brings up the problem of the possibility of structural in-
terruptions that are caused by the anticompetitive incident in question. Future 
prices and quantities are predicted by employing a model of the pre-incident 
market, calibrated with pre-incident data and adjusted to the post-incident situa-
tion by parameters like market share, cost variables or measures of product 
variability. On the one hand, this has been criticized from an econometric and 
statistics perspective. Price increases are often approximated by assuming that 
elasticities and market shares of the outsiders (e.g. the non-merging firms in 
merger cases) will be unchanged post-merger. This might represent an inade- 
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quate extrapolation (Kokkoris 2005; Capps et al. 2003). On the other hand, it 
might be questionable whether the basic form of competition remains un-
changed – for instance, Bertrand-competition will remain Bertrand-competition 
and not switch to Cournot-competition, or vice versa, etc. While this assump-
tion may be unproblematic in many cases, there is some plausibility, however, 
that it is not in other cases (Werden 1997: 98). 
 
For instance, mergers in narrow oligopolies are considered to be a particularly 
rewarding area for merger simulation (because of their complex economic ef-
fects). If the market structure changes in a narrow oligopoly, say for instance 
from 4 to 3 or 3 to 2, this implies a particularly severe change of the business 
environment for the oligopolists and, therefore, their adjustment of strategies 
might be more than marginal. Considerable changes in the way oligopolists are 
competing, however, tend to overstrain predictive methods because of the miss-
ing nexus to measurable past market behaviour. As insights from cognitive eco-
nomics (e.g. Kahneman 2003a, 2003b) demonstrate, decision-makers tend to 
create alternative strategies not until the ‘old’ recipes fail (new framing; ad-
justment of mental models), in other words, changes in the form of competition 
can hardly be simulated because they are not predictable and non-anticipatable 
as they are non-existent before the new situation actually takes place.
25 This is 
related to the criticism that changes in price incentives are usually not captured 
(Farrell & Shapiro 2008: 24-25), changes that generate structural interruptions 
that disallow extrapolating past patterns into the future.  
 
The possible occurrence of structural interruptions represents a serious and non-
negligible problem exactly because the most challenging potential anticompeti-
tive incidents exert the strongest impacts on market environments and decision 
frameworks of the players. Mergers in narrow oligopolies as well as abuses of 
dominant positions can represent a discontinuity in market evolution, signifi-
cantly changing the underlying competition process and the played strategies, 
                                                            
25   For applications to competition economics see e.g. Budzinski (2004) and Kerber (2006).  
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inducing creative and non-anticipatable reaction patterns. Advances in industri-
al economics oligopoly theory will certainly improve models of competition 
processes, however, there is certainly serious doubt whether the problem of 
(non-anticipatable) structural interruptions can be solved in such a framework. 
3.6.  Costs-Benefit-Analysis  
Any serious economic analysis of policy instruments must take a look at the 
costs of the instruments in question and put them in relation to the (expected) 
benefits. While potential problems with the latter have been addressed in the 
preceding subchapters, the cost side has been ignored so far. Some authors, 
however, point out that the innovative instruments of an industrial economics-
based competition policy are no cheap instruments but involve significant costs 
instead (Schmalensee 1982; Voigt & Schmidt 2004; Christiansen 2006). These 
costs include ‘direct’ costs like costs of data collection, payment for expertise, 
computer hours, manpower, etc. as well as costs in terms of a potential exten-
sion of the duration of proceedings and possibly reduction in legal certainty 
(Zimmer 2006). The latter might result from a decreased predictability of the 
outcome of the competitive assessment: a more structural analysis along the 
lines of rather rough proxies might be easier to anticipate by business compa-
nies in advance of the actual authority decision than the outcomes of a detailed 
case-by-case analysis and simulation. Since rational business companies con-
sider competition laws and authority practice when designing a merger project 
or a competitive strategy, decreased legal certainty causes additional costs for 
business activities. This may be welcomed regarding the deterrence effects on 
anticompetitive strategies, however, legal uncertainty also creates a cost burden 
and a deterrence effect on efficiency-increasing combinations and strategies. 
While legal uncertainty predominantly burdens business, the increased costs for 
data collection, model building, expertise payments, etc. hits both the business 
companies, who might want to challenge the assessment of the antitrust authori- 
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ties with own expertises,
26 and competition agencies, the latter implying in-
creasing costs for taxpayers. 
 
It can hardly be denied that a detailed quantitative-economic analysis of a case 
is more costly than a more structural analysis relying on more or less rough 
proxies and ‘rules-of-thumb’. This is, however, easily justifiable if the benefits 
from the new instruments (better decisions) outscore the additional costs. Even-
tually, this points to an empirical question: are the results of, for instance, 
econometric analyses of collusive patterns or merger simulations so much better 
than more traditional analyses that they justify the increased costs? Unfortu-
nately, to my best knowledge, cost-benefits-analyses along these lines are not 
available, so that the outcome remains speculative. There is some preliminary 
indication that the benefits might outweigh the costs regarding cartel detection 
whereas the hitherto record of merger simulation models in antitrust cases 
might not be so convincing (Walker 2005; Budzinski & Ruhmer 2009) and a 
justification of the additional costs might be more difficult here. 
 
However, does the cost-benefit issue – a problem actually calling for a better 
‘controlling’ of competition policies – really represent a limitation on the use of 
modern industrial economics as the fundament of competition policy? This 
would only be the case, if a tendency towards more case-by-case analyses and 
expensive in-depth investigations of alleged anticompetitive mergers and busi-
ness strategies was an imperative consequence of injecting modern industrial 
economics into antitrust. If, however, the question of ‘case-by-case approach 
vs. rule-based approach’ can be uncoupled from the question of rooting compe-
tition policy in modern industrial economics, then the cost-benefit issue points 
more towards the question of how to use modern industrial economics (instead 
of the question whether to use it). 
                                                            
26   Friederiszick (2009: 4) estimates the annual turnover of the European antitrust related economic 
consultancy industry to be about 60 million € in 2008, increasing from virtually zero in the early 
1990s and with a further increasing tendency.  
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4.  Implications for Competition Policy and the More 
Economic Approach 
Altogether, the discussion in the preceding chapter reveals several limits and 
open problems although some of the criticisms raised in the literature must be 
rejected or at least considerably qualified regarding their importance. Further-
more, in order to put the derived limits into perspective, two general remarks 
are very important: 
 
1. A general difference between the typical fields of competition policy can 
be identified, namely between fields that predominantly rely upon ex post 
analysis (like cartel policy) and such that entail more predictive ex ante 
analysis (like merger control; abusive, exclusionary and predatory strate-
gies). Many of the valid limitations and criticisms discussed in this paper 
predominantly hit the forward-oriented, predictive part of competition 
analysis and accompanying policies. In backward-oriented policy areas, 
predominantly or even exclusively dealing with the detection of things 
that happened in the past, modern industrial economics instruments per-
form much better and less controversial than in areas, where the forward-
oriented, predictive part is very important. For instance, econometric 
methods and industrial economic theories have considerably improved 
anticartel policy through an improved (econometric) detection of collu-
sive patterns, the appropriate use of leniency programs, specifying char-
acteristics of markets prone to collusion, etc. Modern industrial econom-
ics-based competition policy looks like a success story in this area. How-
ever, in merger control and abuse control, the record is much more mixed, 
corresponding to the fact that the detection and documentation of past 
patterns – although important – do not suffice here. The predictive part 
inevitably plays an important role in these areas and this creates several 
problems for quantitative economic analysis (see section 3). 
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2. Many problems do not result from employing modern industrial econom-
ics per se. Instead, they result from the way modern industrial economics 
is employed – namely for in-depth case-by-case analyses.
27 Apparent 
limitations – like data availability, competing models, unintended under-
enforcement and unfavourable cost-benefit relations – are actually more a 
consequence of a tendency towards more case-by-case analyses and away 
from a rule-based competition policy. However, if ‘modern industrial 
economics vs. other competition theories’ and ‘case-by-case vs. rule-
based approaches’ become disentangled, then these problems can be di-
rected more closely to their actual cause. Modern industrial economics is 
a theory of competitive harm and as such it serves to inform competition 
policy. The question whether competition policy should be done on a 
more rule-based or more case-by-case-based approach, however, relates 
to a theory of competition policy, for instance an institutional theory, tak-
ing into account the institutional environment, the specifics of law and 
court proceedings, the imperfections and deficiencies of real-world policy 
procedures, etc. In other words, modern industrial economics can be used 
in different ways: to quantify welfare effects of single cases – but alterna-
tively also to shape and design better rules codifying robust presumptions 
of anticompetitive impact that are only in exceptional cases subject to an 
in-depth ‘rebuttal’ analysis.
28 A reasoning along these lines would advo-
cate for combining modern industrial economics with modern institu- 
                                                            
27   “Moreover, since the state of industrial organization economics is such that the longer the list of fac-
tors that must be weighed, the more the ultimate outcome reflects judgment, decisions would proba-
bly become the less predictable. Such a procedure gives no guarantee of reaching better decisions on 
average" (Schmalensee 1987:46). “Legislation that would require anything approaching a full-
blown cost-benefit analysis would produce both long trials and unpredictable decisions“ (ibid: 42). 
28   Recent proposals from leading industrial economists to overcome the underenforcement problem 
are very much compatible with this reasoning (see e.g. Farrell & Shapiro 2008).    
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Next to the complex interplay of the economics of competitive harm with the 
economics of rules and antitrust enforcement, the multifaceted, multidimen-
sional character of competition as an evolutionary process represents a major 
challenge for any competition policy and in particular for a modern-economics 
based antitrust strategy with its inherent focus on short-run price and quantity 
effects. Partly, advances within the paradigm of contemporary industrial eco-
nomics will certainly alleviate this challenge. However, in addition to internal 
progress, a prospective way forward could be to embrace other sub-disciplines 
of modern economic research, like for instance innovation and evolutionary 
economics (e.g. Baker 2007, 2008; Katz & Shelanski 2007a; Cantner 2009; 
Kerber 2009b) or behavioural and experimental economics (e.g. Engel 2009; 
Haucap 2009; Wilson 2009) and integrate their insights into the analysis. This 
process has started but still remains in its infancy. 
 
In summary, this essay shows that there are sustainable limits to applying mod-
ern industrial economics as a case-by-case antitrust analysis that involves pre-
dictive economic evidence. However, this refers not so much to the question 
whether modern industrial economics represents an important ingredient of 
competition policy. Instead, it points to the way in which modern industrial 
economics is used. A lot of the current limits can probably be alleviated if the 
insights from modern industrial economics are applied to design and shape bet-
ter competition rules – and the rules (the law) and their application pay respect 
to the economics of rules, the institutional environment as well as to the special 
                                                            
29   See also Christiansen & Kerber (2006), Kerber (2006), Kerber et al. (2008) as well as the chapter 
from Haucap (2009) in this volume. 
30   It is a widespread misapprehension, for instance, to state a principal incompatibility between the 
German ordoliberalism tradition and modern industrial economics (like e.g. Ahlborn & Evans 
(2008) so vehemently do). Ordoliberalism is a theory of how to do shape the competition policy sys-
tem. As such, it can be combined with different theories of competitive harm, including modern in-
dustrial economics.   
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characteristics of applying law and exercising policies. The most important re-
search questions address the multi-dimensional character of competition. Al-
though progress is already visible in this regard and industrial economics-
informed competition analysis is moving away from focusing on prices and 
quantities only, there remains a lot of work to do. Embracing the insights from 
other sub-disciplines of (competition) economics, like institutional, behavioural, 
evolutionary or experimental (competition) economics, could be helpful in ac-
celerating the respective theory progress. If it comes to applying economics to 
policy practice, paradigmatic ignorance and insistence on theory monoculture is 
definitely the wrong avenue. Recent developments indicate that this insight is 
gaining more and more advocates.  
36 
5.  References 
Ahlborn, Christian & Padilla, A. Jorge (2008), From Fairness to Welfare: Im-
plications for the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition 
Law, in: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis (ed.), A Reformed Approach 
to Article 82 EC, Oxford: Hart, pp. 55-102. 
 
Aigner, Gisela, Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt (2007), The Analysis 
of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where Do We Stand after 
Sony/BMG and Impala?, in: European Competition Journal, Vol. 3 (1), pp. 63-
88. 
 
Ashenfelter, Orley & Hosken, Daniel (2008), The Effects of Mergers on Con-
sumer Prices: Evidence from Five Selected Case Studies, NBER Working Pa-
per 13859, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
Audretsch, David B., Baumol, William J. & Burke, Andrew E. (2001), Compe-
tition Policy in Dynamic Markets, in: International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization, Vol. 19 (5), pp. 613-634. 
 
Baker, Jonathan B. (1999a), Developments in Antitrust Economics, in: Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13 (1), pp. 181-194. 
 
Baker, Jonathan B. (1999b), Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, in: Jour-
nal of Public Policy & Marketing, Vol. 18 (1), pp. 11-21. 
 
Baker, Jonathan B. (2007), Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fos-
ters Innovation, in: Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 74 (3), pp. 575-602. 
 
Baker, Jonathan B. (2008), Dynamic Competition Does Not Excuse Monopoli-
zation, in: Competition Policy International, Vol. 4 (2).  
37 
Baker, Jonathan B. & Bresnahan, Timothy F. (2008), Economic Evidence in 
Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power, in: Paolo Buccirossi 
(ed.), Hanbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, pp. 
1-42.  
 
Baker, Jonathan B. & Pitofsky, Robert (2009), A Turning Point in Merger En-
forcement: Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, in: D. Crane & Eleanor M. 
Fox (eds.), Antitrust Stories, Foundation Press, forthcoming. 
 
Baker, Jonathan B. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1999), Empirical Methods in Anti-
trust Litigation: Review and Critique, in: American Law and Economics Re-
view, Vol. 1 (1/2), pp. 386-435. 
 
Baker, Jonathan B. & Shapiro, Carl (2008), Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement, in: Robert Pitofsky (ed.), How the Chicago School Overshot the 
Mark, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 235-291. 
 
Becker, Gary S. (1983), A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98 (3), pp. 371-
400. 
 
Bengtsson, Claes (2005), Simulating the Effect of Oracle’s Takeover of Peop-
leSoft, in: Peter A. G. van Bergeijk & Erik Kloosterhuis (eds.), Modelling Eu-
ropean Mergers. Theory, Competition Policy and Case Studies, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 133-149. 
 
Bertrand, Joseph (1883), Théorie Mathématique de la Richesse Sociale (Re-
view), in: Journal des Savants, Vol. 67, pp. 499-508. 
 
Bresnahan, Timothy F. (2001), The Economics of the Microsoft Case, SIEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 00-50, Stanford University. 
  
38 
Breyer, Stephen (2009), Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review, in: The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 119 (F), pp. 123-135. 
 
Brodley, Joseph P. (1995), Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Pol-
icy, in: Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63 (2), pp. 683-695. 
 
Buccirossi, Paolo (2008, ed.), Hanbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press. 
 
Budzinski, Oliver (2004), An Evolutionary Theory of Competition, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=534862 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.534862. 
 
Budzinski, Oliver (2008), Monoculture versus Diversity in Competition Eco-
nomics, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 32 (2), S. 295-324. 
 
Budzinski, Oliver (2009), Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust 
Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?, in: The Journal of Mergers & Acquisitions, 
Vol. 6 (1), pp. 24-37. 
 
Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt (2007), The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: 
Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary 
Merger Control, in: Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 34 (2), pp. 133-
166. 
 
Budzinski, Oliver & Ruhmer, Isabel (2009), Merger Simulation in Competition 
Policy: A Survey, IME Discussion Paper 84/09. 
 
Cantner, Uwe (2009), Industrial Dynamics and Evolution: The Role of Innova-
tion, Competences and Learning, in: Josef Drexl et al. (eds.), An Economic Ap-




Capps, O., Church, J. & Love, H. A. (2003), Specification Issues and Confi-
dence Intervals in Unilateral Price Effects Analysis, in: Journal of Economet-
rics, Vol. 113 (1), pp. 3-31. 
 
Carlton, Dennis W. (2007), Does Antitrust Need To Be Modernized?, in: Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21 (3), S. 155-176. 
 
Carlton, Dennis W. & Perloff, Jeffrey M. (2005), Modern Industrial Organiza-
tion, 4
th Edition, Boston: Pearson. 
 
Christiansen, Arndt (2006), The More-Economic Approach in EU Merger Con-
trol, in: CESifo Forum, Vol. 7 (1), pp. 34-39. 
 
Christiansen, Arndt (2009), Der More Economic Approach in der EU-
Fusionskontrolle: Entwicklung, konzeptionelle Grundlagen und kritische Ana-
lyse, Dissertation: Philipps-University of Marburg. 
 
Christiansen, Arndt & Kerber, Wolfgang (2006), Competition Policy with Op-
timally Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason", in: 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 2 (2), pp. 215-244. 
 
Cournot, Augustin (1838), Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la 
Théorie des Richesses, Paris: L. Hachette (M. Riviere & Cie.).  
 
Crooke, P., Froeb, Luke M., Tschantz, Steven & Werden, Gregory J. (1999), 
Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria, in: Re-
view of Industrial Organization, Vol. 15, S. 205-217. 
 
Dalkir, S. & Warren-Boulton, F. R. (2004), Prices, Market Definition, and the 
Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot (1997), in: J. E. Kwoka & L. J. White 
(eds.), The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy, 4
th Ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52-72.  
40 
Duso, Tomaso, Guger, Klaus & Yurtoglu, Burcin (2006), How Effective Is 
European Merger Control?, WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2006-12. 
 
Edlin, Aaron S. & Emch, Eric R. (1999), The Welfare Losses from Price-
Matching Policies, in: Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 47 (1), pp. 145-
167. 
 
Engel, Christoph (2009), Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma, in: Jo-
sef Drexl et al. (eds.), An Economic Approach to Competition Law: Founda-
tions and Limitations, Cheltenham: Elgar, forthcoming. 
 
Evans, David S. & Hylton, Keith (2008), The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise 
of Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, in: 
Competition Policy International, Vol. 4 (2). 
 
Evans, David S. & Salinger, Michael (2002), Competition Thinking at the Eu-
ropean Commission: Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeywell Merger, in: 
George Mason Law Review, Vol. 10 (3), pp. 489-532. 
 
Evans, David S., Nichols, A. L. & Schmalensee, Richard (2005), US vs. Micro-
soft: Did Consumers Win? NBER Working Paper Series 11727, Cambridge, 
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Farrell, Joseph (2006), Complexity, Diversity, and Antitrust, in: The Antitrust 
Bulletin, Vol. 51 (1), pp. 165-173. 
 
Farrell, Joseph & Katz, Michael L. (2006), The Economics of Welfare Stan-
dards in Antitrust, in: Competition Policy International, Vol. 2 (2), S. 3-28. 
 
Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl (2008), Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal 
Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313782.  
41 
Fisher, Franklin M. (1991), Organizing Industrial Organization: Reflections of 
the Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, Vol. 1991 (1), pp. 201-225. 
 
Fisher, Franklin M. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (2001), U.S. v. Microsoft: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, in: The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 46 (1), pp. 1-69. 
 
Fox, Eleanor M. & Sullivan, Lawrence A. (1987), Antitrust – Retrospective and 
Prospective, in: New York University Law Review, Vol. 62, pp. 936-968. 
 
Friederiszick, Hans W. (2009), Economic Analysis in EU Competition Cases, 
in: Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & Joël Monéger (eds), Economic Theory and 
Competition Law, Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 3-19. 
 
Froeb, Luke, Tenn, Steven & Tschantz, Steven (2007), Mergers when Firms 
Compete by Choosing both Price and Promotion, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980941. 
 
Gaffard, Jean-Luc & Quéré, Michel (2006), What’s the Aim for Competition 
Policy: Optimizing Market Structure or Encouraging Innovative Behaviors?, in: 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 16 (1), pp. 175-187. 
 
Gal, Michal S. (2009), Convergence of Competition Law Prohibitions: Founda-
tional Issues, in: Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & Joël Monéger (eds), Economic 
Theory and Competition Law, Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 176-190. 
 
Gerber, David J. (2003), The European Commission’s GE/Honeywell Decision: 
US Responses and their Implications, in: ZWeR Journal of Competition Law, 
Vol. 1 (1), pp. 87-95. 
  
42 
German Monopolies Commission (2006), Sechzehntes Hauptgutachten 
2004/2005: Mehr Wettbewerb auch im Dienstleistungssektor!, BT-Drucksache 
16/2460, http://www.bundestag.de/bic/drucksachen/index.html. 
 
German Monopolies Commission (2008), Siebzehntes Hauptgutachten XVII, 
2006/2007, Weniger Staat, mehr Wettbewerb, 
http://www.monopolkommission.de/haupt_17/gesamtfassung_h17.pdf. 
 
Gilbert, R. J. & Katz, Michael L. (2001), An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Mi-
crosoft, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15 (2), pp. 25-44. 
 
Goldschmid, Harvey J. (2008), The Chicago School Has Made Us too Cautious 
about False Positives and the Use of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in: Robert 
Pitofsky (ed.), How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 123-137. 
 
Graglia, Lino (2007), The Strange Career of the Law of Resale Price Mainte-
nance, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028562. 
 
Hansen, Lars P. & Heckman, James J. (1996), The Empirical Foundations of 
Calibration, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10 (1), pp. 87-104. 
 
Haucap, Justus (2009), Bounded Rationality and Competition Policy, in: Josef 
Drexl et al. (eds.), An Economic Approach to Competition Law: Foundations 
and Limitations, Cheltenham: Elgar, forthcoming. 
 
Hausman, J. & G. K. Leonard (2005), Using Merger Simulation Models: Test-
ing the Underlying Assumptions, in: International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation, Vol. 23, pp. 693-698. 
  
43 
Hayek, Friedrich August von (1948), The Meaning of Competition, in: Hayek, 
Friedrich August von (ed.), Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, pp. 92-106. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich August von (1978), Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in: 
Friedrich August von Hayek (ed.), New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Eco-
nomics and the History of Ideas, Chicago, pp. 179-190. 
 
Hovenkamp, Herbert (2001), Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 
in: Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 2001 (2), pp. 257-338. 
 
Hovenkamp, Herbert (2002), Economic Experts in Antitrust Cases, in: D. L. 
Faigman et al. (eds.), Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Ex-
pert Testimony, St. Paul: Thomson/West, pp. 111-143. 
 
Hovenkamp, Herbert (2008), The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Domi-
nant Firm, in: Robert Pitofsky (ed.), How the Chicago School Overshot the 
Mark, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109-122. 
 
Ivaldi, Marc & Verboven, Frank (2005a), Quantifying the Effects from Hori-
zontal Mergers in European Competition Policy, in: International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization, Vol. 23, pp. 669-691. 
 
Ivaldi, Marc & Verboven, Frank (2005b), Quantifying the Effects from Hori-
zontal Mergers: Comments on the Underlying Assumptions, in: International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 23, pp. 699-702. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel (2003a), A Psychological Perspective on Economics, in: 
American Economic Review, Vol. 93 (2), pp. 162-168. 
  
44 
Kahneman, Daniel (2003b), Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Be-
havioral Economics, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 93 (5), pp. 1449-
1475. 
 
Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl (2007), Antitrust, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell (eds), Handbook of Law and Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier 
North-Holland, pp. 1073-1225. 
 
Katz, Michael L. & Shelanski, Howard A. (2007a), Mergers and Innovation, in: 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 74 (1), pp. 1-85. 
 
Katz, Michael L. & Shelanski, Howard A. (2007b), Merger Analysis and the 
Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better, in: Antitrust Law Journal, 
Vol. 74 (3), pp. 537-574.  
 
Kerber, Wolfgang (2006), Competition, Knowledge, and Institutions, in: Jour-
nal of Economic Issues, Vol. XL (2), pp. 1-7. 
 
Kerber, Wolfgang (2009a), Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? 
Some Reflections of an Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competi-
tion Law, in: Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & Joël Monéger (eds), Economic 
Theory and Competition Law, Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 93-120. 
 
Kerber, Wolfgang (2009b), Competition, Innovation and Maintaining Diversity 
Through Competition Law, in: Josef Drexl et al. (eds.), An Economic Approach 
to Competition Law: Foundations and Limitations, Cheltenham: Elgar, forth-
coming.  
 
Kerber, Wolfgang, Kretschmer, Jürgen Peter & von Wangenheim, Georg 
(2008), Optimal Sequential Investigation Rules in Competition Law, MAGKS 
Joint Discussion Paper Series 16-2008. 
  
45 
Kerber, Wolfgang & Schwalbe, Ulrich (2008), Economic Principles of Compe-
tition Law, in: F. J. Säcker et al. (eds), Competition Law: European Community 
Practice and Procedure, London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 202-393. 
 
Kokkoris, I. (2005), Merger Simulation: A Crystal Ball for Assessing Mergers, 
in: World Competition, Vol. 28 (3), pp. 327-348. 
 
Kovacic, William E. & Shapiro, Carl (2000), Antitrust Policy: A Century of 
Economic and Legal Thinking, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14 
(1), pp. 43-60. 
 
Kretschmer, Jürgen Peter & Budzinski, Oliver (2009), Advertised Meeting-the-
Competition Clauses: Collusion Instead of Price Discrimination, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364208. 
 
Lianos, Ioannis (2009), “Judging” Economists: Economic Expertise in Compe-
tition Law Litigation, in: New Challenges in European Competition Law, The 
Hague: Kluwer, forthcoming. 
 
Lipczynski, John, Wilson, John & Goddard, John (2005), Industrial Organiza-
tion: Competition, Strategy, Policy, 2
nd edition, Prentice Hall: Pearson. 
 
Lyons, Bruce (2008), The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative Abuse, CCP 
Working Paper 2008-1, Norwich: University of East Anglia. 
 
Mandel, Michael J. (1999), Going for Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses, 
in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 113-120. 
 
Möschel, Wernhard (2001), The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an 
Ordoliberal Perspective: The Example of Competition Policy, in: Journal of In-
stitutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 157 (1), pp. 3-13. 
  
46 
Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Neumann, Manfred & Weigand, Jürgen (2004, eds), The International Hand-
book of Competition, Cheltenham: Elgar. 
 
Neven, Damien J. (2006), Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe, in: 
Economic Policy, Vol. 21 (48), pp. 742-791. 
 
Parret, Laura (2008), Sense and Nonsense of Rules on Proof in Cartel Cases: 
How to Reconcile a More Economics-Based Approach to Competition Law 
with more Attention for Rules on Proof, in: European Competition Journal, Vol. 
4 (1), pp. 169-199. 
 
Peeperkorn, Luc (2008), Resale Price Maintenance and its Alleged Efficiencies, 
in: European Competition Journal, Vol. 4 (1), pp. 201-212. 
 
Pitofsky, Robert (2008; ed.), How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The 
Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Posner, Richard A. (1979), The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, in: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127 (4), pp. 925-948. 
 
Posner, Richard A. (1999), The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert 
Witness, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 91-99. 
 
Reynolds, Robert J. & Ordover, Janusz A. (2002), Archimedean Leveraging 




Riordan, Michael H. & Salop, Steven C. (1995), Evaluating Vertical Mergers: 
A Post-Chicago Approach, in: Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63 (2), pp. 513-568. 
Robinson, Joan (1962), Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Röller, Lars-Hendrik (2005), Economic Analysis and Competition Policy En-
forcement in Europe, in: P. Van Bergeijk and E. Kloosterhuis (eds.), Modelling 
European Mergers: Theory, Competition Policy and Case Studies, Cheltenham: 
Elgar, pp. 11-24. 
 
Röller, Lars-Hendrik & De La Mano, Miguel (2006), The Impact of the New 
Substantive Test in European Merger Control, in: European Competition Jour-
nal, Vol. 2 (1), pp. 9-28. 
 
Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Stehmann, Oliver (2006), The Year 2005 at DG Com-
petition: The Trend towards a More Effects-Based Approach, in: Review of In-
dustrial Organization, Vol. 29 (4), pp. 281-304. 
 
Salop, Steven C. (1986), Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-
ordination, in: Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. F. Mathewson (eds.), New Developments 
in the Analysis of Market Structure, Basingstoke: MacMillan, pp. 265-290. 
 
Salop, Steven C. (2007), The Controversy over the Proper Antitrust Standard 
for Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct, in: Barry E. Hawk (ed.), Annual 
Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute, Vol. 33, New York: Ju-
ris, pp. 477-508. 
 
Salop, Steven C. (2008), Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct, 
in: Robert Pitofsky (ed.), How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 141-155. 
  
48 
Scheffman, David T. (2004), Whither Merger Simulation?, 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/040129scheffman.pdf. 
 
Schmalensee, Richard (1982), Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics, in: 
American Economic Review, Vol. 72 (2), pp. 24-28.  
 
Schmalensee, Richard (1987), Horizontal Merger Policy: Problems and 
Changes, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 1 (2), pp. 41-54. 
 
Schmalensee, Richard (2001), Lessons from the Microsoft Case, EUI Working 
Papers, Florence: European University Institute. 
 
Schmalensee, Richard (2008), Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S. Anti-
trust, in: Robert Pitofsky (ed.), How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-23. 
 
Schmidt, André (2008), Ordnungsökonomische Wettbewerbskonzepte: die 
Wettbewerbspolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Freiheit und Effizienz, in: Or-
do, Vol. 59, pp. 209-236. 
 
Schmidt, Ingo (2007), The Suitability of the More Economic Approach for 
Competition Policy: Dynamic v Static Efficiency, in: European Competition 
Law Review, Vol. 28 (7), pp. 408-411. 
 
Schmidt, Ingo (2008), More Economic Approach: Der performance-Test als 
“invitation to nonenforcement”, in: Marina Grusevaja et al. (eds), Quo vadis 
Wirtschaftspolitik? Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, pp. 65-74. 
 
Schmidt, Ingo & Rittaler, Jan B. (1989), A Critical Evaluation of the Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
  
49 
Seldeslachts, Jo, Clougherty, Joseph A. & Barros, Pedro Pita (2007), Remedy 
for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy 
Tools, Discussion Paper No. 218, GESY – Governance and the Efficiency of 
Economic Systems, Mannheim. 
 
Sørgard, Lars (2008), Optimal Merger Policy, Discussion Paper, Norwegian 
School of Economics and Business Administration. 
 
Tirole, Jean (2004), The Theory of Industrial Organization, 15
th edition, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
 
Voigt, Stefan & Schmidt, André (2004), Switching to Substantial Impediments 
of Competition (SIC) can have Substantial Costs – SIC!, in: European Competi-
tion Law Review, Vol. 25(9), pp. 584-589. 
 
Walker, Mike (2005), The Potential for Significant Inaccuracies in Merger Si-
mulation Models, in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 1 (3), 
pp. 473-496. 
 
Weinberg, Matthew (2008), The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in: Jour-
nal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4 (2), pp. 433-447. 
 
Werden, Gregory J. (1997), Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products 
Mergers: A Practitioners’ Guide, Economic Analysis Group, Proceedings of 
NE-165 Conference, June 20-21, 1996, Washington, D.C. 
 
Werden, Gregory J. (2001), Microsoft's Pricing of Windows and the Economics 
of Derived Demand Monopoly, in: Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 18 
(3), pp. 257-262. 
 
Werden, Gregory J. (2005), Merger  Simulation: Potentials and Pitfalls, in: Pe-
ter A.G. van Bergeijk & Erik Kloosterhuis (eds), Modelling European Mergers.  
50 
Theory, Competition Policy and Case Studies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 
37-52. 
 
Werden, Gregory J. (2007), The Admissibility of Expert Economic Testimony 
in Antitrust Cases, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956397. 
 
Werden, Gregory J. & Froeb, Luke M. (2008), Unilateral Competitive Effects 
of Horizontal Mergers, in: Paolo Buccirossi (ed.), Hanbook of Antitrust Eco-
nomics, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, pp. 43-104. 
 
Werden, Gregory J., Froeb, Luke M. & Scheffman, David T. (2004), A Daubert 
Discipline for Merger Simulation, http://www.ftc.gov/be/daubertdiscipline.pdf. 
 
Wigger, Angela (2009), The Political Role of Experts in Shaping EU Competi-
tion Regulation, Conference Paper, Lisbon. 
 
Wilson, Bart J. (2009), How Undergraduates Can Teach Experts a Thing or 
Two about Competition, in: Josef Drexl et al. (eds.), An Economic Approach to 
Competition Law: Foundations and Limitations, Cheltenham: Elgar, forthcom-
ing.  
 
Wood, Diane P. (1999), The Role of Economics and Economists in Competi-
tion Cases, in: OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 
82-104. 
 
Zimmer, Daniel (2006), Vorzüge und Leistungsgrenzen quantitativ-
ökonomischer Analysen in Fusionskontrollverfahren: das Beispiel Orac-
le/PeopleSoft, in: I. Brinker & R. Bechtold (eds.), Recht und Wettbewerb, 
München: Beck, pp. 677-695.  
51 
Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
Institut for Miljø- og Erhvervsøkonomi (IME) 
 
 





Issued working papers from IME 
Udgivne arbejdspapirer fra IME 
No.    
1/99  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Hans Frost 
Asymmetrisk information og regulering af for-
urening 
2/99 Finn  Olesen  Monetær integration i EU 
3/99 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Regulation of Renewable Resources in Fed-
eral Systems: The Case of Fishery in the EU 
4/99 Villy  Søgaard  The Development of Organic Farming in 
Europe 
5/99 Teit  Lüthje 
Finn Olesen 
EU som handelsskabende faktor? 
6/99  Carsten Lynge Jensen  A Critical Review of the Common Fisheries 
Policy 
7/00  Carsten Lynge Jensen  Output Substitution in a Regulated Fishery 
8/00 Finn  Olesen  Jørgen Henrik Gelting – En betydende dansk 
keynesianer 
9/00 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regula-
tion: The Case of Illegal Landings 
10/00 Finn  Olesen  Moral, etik og økonomi  
52 
11/00 Birgit  Nahrstedt  Legal Aspect of Border Commuting in the 
Danish-German Border Region 
12/00 Finn  Olesen  Om Økonomi, matematik og videnskabelighed 
- et bud på provokation 
13/00  Finn Olesen 
Jørgen Drud Hansen 
European Integration: Some stylised facts 
14/01  Lone Grønbæk  Fishery Economics and Game Theory 
15/01  Finn Olesen  Jørgen Pedersen on fiscal policy - A note 
16/01  Frank Jensen  A Critical Review of the Fisheries Policy: To-
tal Allowable Catches and Rations for Cod in 
the North Sea 
17/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Are uniform solutions focal? The case of in-
ternational environmental agreements 
18/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Group Uniform Solutions 
19/01  Frank Jensen  Prices versus Quantities for Common Pool 
Resources 
20/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Uniform Reductions are not that Bad 
21/01  Finn Olesen 
Frank Jensen 
A note on Marx 
22/01  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague 
23/01  Finn Olesen  Den marginalistiske revolution: En dansk spi-
re der ikke slog rod? 
24/01  Tommy Poulsen  Skattekonkurrence og EU's skattestruktur 
25/01  Knud Sinding  Environmental Management Systems as 
Sources of Competitive Advantage 
26/01  Finn Olesen  On Machinery. Tog Ricardo fejl? 
27/01  Finn Olesen  Ernst Brandes: Samfundsspørgsmaal - en kri-
tik af Malthus og Ricardo 
28/01  Henrik Herlau 
Helge Tetzschner 
Securing Knowledge Assets in the Early Phase 
of Innovation  
53 
29/02  Finn Olesen  Økonomisk teorihistorie  
Overflødig information eller brugbar ballast? 
30/02  Finn Olesen  Om god økonomisk metode 
– beskrivelse af et lukket eller et åbent socialt 
system? 
31/02  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak  The Dynamics of an Open Access: The case of 
the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery – A Strategic Ap-
proach - 
32/02  Niels Vestergaard 
Dale Squires 
Frank Jensen 
Jesper Levring Andersen 
Technical Efficiency of the Danish Trawl fleet: 
Are the Industrial Vessels Better Than Others?
33/02  Birgit Nahrstedt 
Henning P. Jørgensen 
Ayoe Hoff 
Estimation of Production Functions on Fish-
ery: A Danish Survey 
34/02  Hans Jørgen Skriver  Organisationskulturens betydning for videns-
delingen mellem daginstitutionsledere i Varde 
Kommune 
35/02  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case of 
GHG trade in the EU 
36/02  Philip Peck 
Knud Sinding 
Environmental and Social Disclosure and 
Data-Richness in the Mining Industry 
37/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests 
and global climate negotiations 
38/03  Finn Olesen  Ivar Jantzen – ingeniøren, som beskæftigede 
sig med økonomi 
39/03  Finn Olesen  Jens Warming: den miskendte økonom 
40/03  Urs Steiner Brandt  Unilateral actions, the case of international 
environmental problems 
41/03  Finn Olesen  Isi Grünbaum: den politiske økonom 
42/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrange-
ment: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved 
the Kyoto-Agreement?  
54 
43/03  Frank Jensen 
Max Nielsen 
Eva Roth 
Application of the Inverse Almost Ideal De-
mand System to Welfare Analysis 
44/03  Finn Olesen  Rudolf Christiani – en interessant rigsdags-
mand? 
45/03  Finn Olesen  Kjeld Philip – en økonom som også blev poli-
tiker 
46/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking in the European 
Union 
47/03  Bodil Stilling Blichfeldt  Unmanageable Tourism Destination Brands?
48/03  Eva Roth 
Susanne Jensen 
Impact of recreational fishery on the formal 
Danish economy 
49/03  Helge Tetzschner 
Henrik Herlau 
Innovation and social entrepreneurship in 
tourism - A potential for local business de-
velopment? 
50/03  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Marko Lindroos 
An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen 
and Authorities forming Coalitions 
51/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
The Political Economy of Climate Change 
Policy in the EU: Auction and Grandfather-
ing 
52/03  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Review of Mathematical Programming for 
Coastal Land Use Optimization 
53/04  Max Nielsen 
Frank Jensen 
Eva Roth 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Public Labelling 
Scheme of Fish Quality 
54/04  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Fisheries Management with Multiple Market 
Failures 







56/04  Bodil Stilling Blichfeldt  Approaches of Fast Moving Consumer Good 
Brand Manufacturers Product Development 
“Safe players” versus “Productors”: Impli-
cations for Retailers’ Management of Manu-
facturer Relations 
57/04  Svend Ole Madsen 
Ole Stegmann Mikkelsen 
Interactions between HQ and divisions in a 
MNC 
- Some consequences of IT implementation on 
organizing supply activities 
58/04  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Frank Jensen 
Lars Gårn Hansen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Ratcheting in Renewable Resources Con-
tracting 
59/04  Pernille Eskerod 
Anna Lund Jepsen 
Voluntary Enrolment – A Viable Way of Staff-
ing Projects? 
60/04  Finn Olesen  Den prækeynesianske Malthus 
61/05  Ragnar Arnason 
Leif K. Sandal 
Stein Ivar Steinshamn 
Niels Vestergaard 
Actual versus Optimal Fisheries Policies: An 
Evaluation of the Cod Fishing Policies of 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway 
62/05  Bodil Stilling Blichfeldt 
Jesper Rank Andersen 
On Research in Action and Action in Re-
search 
63/05  Urs Steiner Brandt  Lobbyism and Climate Change in Fisheries: 
A Political Support Function Approach 
64/05  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  An Optimal Corrective Tax for Thai Shrimp 
Farming 
65/05  Henning P. Jørgensen 
Kurt Hjort-Gregersen 
Socio-economic impact in a region in the 
southern part of Jutland by the establishment 
of a plant for processing of bio ethanol 
66/05  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Options and Tradeoffs in Krabi’s Coastal 
Land Use  
56 
67/06  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Optimal Coastal Land Use and Management 
in Krabi, Thailand: Compromise Program-
ming Approach 
68/06  Anna Lund Jepsen 
Svend Ole Madsen 
Developing competences designed to create 
customer value 
69/06  Finn Olesen  Værdifri samfundsvidenskab? - nogle reflek-
sioner om økonomi 
70/06  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Toward Environmental Responsibility of Thai 
Shrimp Farming through a Voluntary Man-
agement Scheme 
71/06  Finn Olesen  Rational Economic Man og Bounded Ratio-
nality – Nogle betragtninger over rationali-
tetsbegrebet i økonomisk teori 
72/06  Urs Steiner Brandt  The Effect of Climate Change on the Proba-
bility of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation 
as a Policy Contest 
73/06  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate 
Change. The Case of International Fisheries 
Agreements 
74/06  Finn Olesen  Lange and his 1938-contribution – An early 
Keynesian 
75/07  Finn Olesen  Kritisk realisme og post keynesianisme. 
76/07  Finn Olesen  Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis – A 
note on a 1963 Post Keynesian Macroeco-
nomic textbook 
77/07  Finn Olesen  Betydningen af Keynes’ metodologi for aktuel 
makroøkonomisk forskning – En Ph.D. fore-
læsning  
78/08  Urs Steiner Brandt  Håndtering af usikkerhed og betydningen af 
innovationer i klimaproblematikken: Med 
udgangspunkt i Stern rapporten 
79/08  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Marko Lindroos 
On Species Preservation and Non-
Cooperative Exploiters  
57 
80/08  Urs Steiner Brandt  What can facilitate cooperation: Fairness, 
ineaulity aversion, punishment, norms or 
trust? 
81/08  Finn Olesen  Heterodoks skepsis – om matematisk 
formalisme i økonomi 
82/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Isabel Ruhmer 
Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A 
Survey 
83/09  Oliver Budzinski  An International Multilevel Competition Pol-
icy System 
84/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer 
Implications of Unprofitable Horizontal 
Mergers: A Positive External Effect Does Not 
Suffice To Clear A Merger! 
85/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Janina Satzer 
Sports Business and the Theory of Multisided 
Markets 
86/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  Ecosystem Management – A Management 
View 
87/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  A Size-Based Ecosystem Model 
88/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  Intertemporal Choice of Marine Ecosystem 
Exploitation 
89/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  The Stock Concept Applicability for the Eco-
nomic Evaluation of Marine Ecosystem Ex-
ploitation 
90/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer 
Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemploy-
ment, and Welfare 
91/09  Finn Olesen  A Treatise on Money – et teorihistorisk case 
studie 
92/09  Jurijs Grizans  Urban Issues and Solutions in the Context of 
Sustainable Development. A review of the lit-
erature 
93/09  Oliver Budzinski  Modern Industrial Economics and Competition 
Policy: Open Problems and Possible limits  
58 
 